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THE RuLE OF LAw IN A FREE SOCIETY: A Report on the International 
Congress of Jurists. Geneva, Switzerland: International Commission of 
Jurists, 1960. Pp. xi, 340. $2.00. 
This volume surveys the activities of the International Commission of 
Jurists through its second International Congress, held in New Delhi, 
January 5-10, 1959. Organized in 1952 by an international congress of 
jurists meeting in West Berlin to consider the alleged deprivation of human 
rights in East Germany and other eastern European countries, the Com-
mission through its permanent Secretariat in Geneva serves as a sort of 
watchdog and publicist of the legal traditions of the West. While a number 
of its activities have related directly to events in the Cold War (the 1957 
Conference on Hungary and the more recent report on Tibet prepared by 
a Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Purshattam Trikamdas, an 
outstanding Indian lawyer), it has also investigated and published reports 
on such critical events in the non-Communist nations as the South African 
Treason Trial. The Commission is not a mass-membership organization; 
the number of members is limited by its statute to twenty-five. In twenty-
six countries, however, national sections have been organized to cooperate 
in its work. Although there is an American section and the American 
Bar Association has established a committee to cooperate with the Com-
mission, the purposes and activities of the Commission appear to be little 
known among American lawyers. 
The theme of the Commission's work is advancement throughout the 
world of the Rule of Law. The thrust of this much used and perhaps 
abused term began to emerge in the Act of Athens of 1955 (p. 2 of this 
volume). The jurists assembled under the auspices of the Commission 
declared there that the Rule of Law "springs from the rights of the indi-
1961] REcENT BooKS 1287 
vidual developed through history in the age-old struggle of mankind for 
freedom," which rights include freedom of speech, press, worship, assembly, 
association, and the right to free elections. Those devoted to a greater con-
ceptual precision might with reason complain about this formulation. The 
"Rule of Law" is derivative from certain human rights, but these rights 
are themselves the product of historical struggles for freedom, which in 
certain societies presumably eventuated in legal recognition and protection. 
One might ask what status these "rights" enjoyed before the struggle was 
won. If they became "rights" only by legal recognition, the Rule of Law 
which springs from them becomes only a descriptive cliche for a certain 
pattern of legal enactments, rather than a norm demanding such enactments. 
The Act of Athens did not pause over such niceties. Under the banner 
of the Rule of Law, the act declares that "the State is subject to the law," 
that governments should respect and enforce individual rights, that judges, 
resisting encroachments on their independence, should be guided by the 
Rule of Law, and that lawyers should preserve their professional independ- • 
ence, assert individual rights under the Rule of Law and insist on a fair 
trial for every accused. This view of the Rule of Law is fairly familiar. 
Grounded on a rather fuzzy natural law persuasion, it emphasizes the re-
current tension between individual interests and governmental action and 
seeks to rally an independent judiciary and bar to erect safeguards around 
some of these interests. Its import is negative in the sense that government 
is viewed as the enemy and its restraint the objective. 
The present volume concentrates on deliberations of the Congress in 
New Delhi which sought to refine and elaborate the Rule of Law concept. 
The central document is a Working Paper (pp. 187-321) prepared by Mr. 
Norman Marsh, then the Secretary-General of the Commission. The scholar-
ship reflected in this Paper, its objectivity and balance make it an impor-
tant contribution to legal and political philosophy. After the Athens 
Congress, Mr. Marsh prepared a questionnaire on a number of significant 
aspects of the legal order (pp. 183-186) and solicited answers from leading 
jurists in many countries. Following in the main the outlines of the ques-
tionnaire, Mr. Marsh and his consultants prepared the Working Paper 
under four headings: The Legislative and the Rule of Law, the Executive 
and the Rule of Law, the Criminal Process and the Rule of Law, and the 
Judiciary and Legal Profession under the Rule of Law. Each of these 
principal topics was assigned to one of the deliberative committees at Delhi. 
A summary of the discussion in each committee is included in the book, 
and a remarkable amount of the spark these discussions doubtless had is 
preserved. 
The Working Paper organizes and presents much of the information on 
various legal systems elicited by the questionnaire. While Britain, the 
United States, France and Germany are emphasized, there are numerous 
references to the law of the Soviet Union, as well as of India and other 
nations that have achieved independence in recent years. Under each major 
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heading a number of conclusions are suggested as the basis for discussion. 
In general these were accepted by the jurists at New Delhi. 
A brief review cannot do justice to the wide-ranging content of the 
Working Paper, but a few brief comments may suggest the extent to which 
reflection on the nature of the Rule of Law matured between the Act of 
Athens and the Declaration of Delhi which emerged from the discussions 
of the Working Paper. In short, the Rule of Law is now taken as "a con-
venient term to summarize a combination on the one hand of certain 
fundamental ideals concerning the purposes of organized society and on 
the other of practical experience in terms of legal institutions, procedures 
and traditions, by which these ideals may be given effect." Implicit in this 
definition are two aspects: (I) certain value acceptances or assumptions 
concerning man and his place in and relation to society; (2) various pro-
cedural devices by which these value acceptances are implemented. Thus, 
a scheme of critical values or ideals is placed in the center of the stage. 
The focal point is the recognition of "the supreme value of human per-
sonality and ... [the conception] of all social institutions, and in particular 
the State, as the servants rather than the masters of [the] individuals." It 
is worth noting that no validation of this value structure other than the 
fact of its widespread acceptance is offered. In discussing the procedural 
devices which translate the value acceptances into practical effects, Mr. 
Marsh shows a laudable lack of dogmatism. The approach is pragmatic; 
certain described institutions have in experience shown themselves to be 
useful. But not all credit is given to specifically legal techniques, and 
there is a pervasive recognition that no collection of techniques can pre-
serve the essential values in a society that no longer esteems them highly. 
The Working Paper, discussions in the committees, and the final 
Declaration of Delhi reflect one highly significant development in thought 
about the Rule of Law. In the words of the Declaration, the Rule of Law 
is "a dynamic concept . . . which should be employed . . . to establish 
social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under which [the 
individual's] legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realized ... .'' Thus 
organized political power is no longer merely "the enemy" to be controlled 
in the interest of individual freedom; it has become the active instrument 
of social progress, economic development and cultural enlightenment. 
This new affirmative aspect of the Rule of Law could not fail to emerge 
in a conference meeting in India, attended by numerous jurists from the 
new nations where the urge for rapid development is acute. Protection of 
the classical fundamental rights of man does not fill empty bellies, forestall 
the ravages of disease, or mobilize for effective action the "revolution of 
expectations" in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Insistent demand for 
positive governmental action to further individual and social welfare is not 
indeed confined to the new, "under-developed" nations. It characterizes 
our era and poses the persistent dilemma which the New Delhi discussions 
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and resolutions so clearly reflect: how can governmental activism in a com-
plex society be reconciled with traditional interests in individual freedom 
and self-determination? 
The concept of the Rule of Law developed in this volume is not the 
magic formula for effecting that reconciliation nor does it pretend to be. 
Perplexing conflicts of legitimate claims will continue to harass thoughtful 
and concerned legislators, executives, judges, and Ia-wyers. If the Rule of 
Law is a dynamic concept calling for the creation of social conditions con-
ducive to the aspirations and dignity of man, lawyers and judges can no 
longer pretend to be its only champions against hostile legislators and 
executives. Each of these must seek a viable balance of interests in the 
light of the tradition, value structure and expectations of society. This 
breadth of view characterized the thinking at New Delhi, although primary 
emphasis was kept on the essentially negative, restraining aspects of the 
Rule of Law. Despite this dual affirmation, it must remain an open ques-
tion whether the individualistic value structure of the West can be estab-
lished or preserved in awakening societies where dynamic initiative 
responding to the clamor for rapid social and economic change can 
realistically be expected only from strong government. For a thoughtful 
contribution to those concerned about this question, a large debt of 
gratitude is owed the International Commission of Jurists and Norman 
Marsh, in particular. 
William B. Harvey, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
